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The market for U.S. Treasury securities is by many
measures the largest, most active debt market in the
world. At the end of September 1999, the amount
of Treasury debt held outside federal government
accounts totaled about $3.6 trillion, close to the
amount of outstanding debt securities issued by all
U.S. corporations combined.1 Moreover, enormous
amounts of Treasury securities are traded every busi-
ness day. Over the ﬁrst nine months of 1999, the
primary dealers in government securities, which are
among the most active participants in the market,
together executed an average of $190 billion worth of
transactions in the securities each day.2
The heavy trading is an indication of the pivotal
role of U.S. Treasury securities in world ﬁnancial
markets. Investors of many types—commercial
banks, investment banks, money market funds, insur-
ance companies, individual investors, and foreign
central banks, among others—use the Treasury mar-
ket for investing and hedging purposes. Yields on the
securities are widely viewed as benchmarks in the
pricing of other debt securities and are analyzed for
the information they might reveal about market par-
ticipants’ expectations about the future path of the
economy and monetary policy.
This article begins with a description of the struc-
ture of the Treasury market, including the process by
which securities are issued in the primary market and
the mechanics of the secondary market. The determi-
nants of investor demand for Treasury securities are
then discussed in some detail. The article concludes
with a discussion of several recent developments and
emergent trends that have affected the market, includ-
ing the advent of inﬂation-indexed securities, a reduc-
tion in the issuance of Treasury securities, and shifts
toward electronic trading and alternative clearing
arrangements.
OVERVIEW OF THE MARKET
The market for U.S. Treasury securities has a com-
plex structure and involves numerous participants—
the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve
System, government securities dealers and brokers,
and other holders of Treasury securities.
Scope of the Market
The federal government ﬁnances its expenditures in
excess of tax receipts through the sale of debt obliga-
tions. Over the years, the Congress has delegated to
the Department of the Treasury its authority under
the Constitution to issue debt securities. The United
States, initially as the Continental Congress, ﬁrst
incurred debt in 1776 when it borrowed funds to
ﬁnance the Revolutionary War.3 Total Treasury debt
remained fairly small in the ﬁrst half of the nine-
teenth century but rose sharply with the Civil War
and again with World War I (chart 1). After declining
slightly, the debt increased nearly threefold during
the Great Depression and exploded in the 1940s as
the government ﬁnanced expenditures related to
World War II. From its postwar low in 1949, out-
standing Treasury debt grew gradually for nearly two
decades before accelerating at the time of the Viet-
nam War and during the subsequent period of high
inﬂation. In the 1980s, the growth of the stock of debt
picked up further, spurred by the tax cuts and rapid
increases in defense spending of the decade.
In recent years, budget surpluses have halted the
upward climb in the total amount of Treasury debt
held outside government accounts. However, the
overall magnitude of outstanding debt remains sub-
stantial, a legacy of past budget deﬁcits. At the end of
1. Corporate debt securities include corporate bonds and commer-
cial paper outstanding and exclude debt and mortgage-backed securi-
ties issued by federal agencies and government-sponsored enterprises.
2. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
3. Rafael A. Bayley, The National Loans of the United States of
America from July 4, 1776 to June 30, 1880, as Prepared for the Tenth
Census of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Ofﬁce, 1883).September 1999, the total par value of outstanding
Treasury debt, including that held in government
accounts, stood at about $5.6 trillion, or about 61 per-
cent of the total annual output of the economy. This
fraction, though considerable, is well below the peak
after World War II (chart 2).
Types of Treasury Securities
Of the $5.6 trillion in outstanding debt at the end of
September 1999, about $3.2 trillion was in the form
of marketable securities—instruments that may be
traded after their initial purchase. These securities are
the focus of this article. New marketable securities
are regularly offered in maturities ranging from thir-
teen weeks to thirty years. Bills—securities having a
maturity of one year or less—sell at a discount from
their face value (par) and do not pay interest before
maturity. Investors realize a return on bills from the
increase in their price to face value at maturity.
Notes—securities having an initial maturity of one to
ten years—and bonds—securities having an initial
maturity of more than ten years—offer investors
semiannual interest payments, or coupons.
More than half the marketable Treasury debt out-
standing is in the form of notes, while bills and bonds
each represent about 20 percent (chart 3). Some of
the outstanding bonds are callable securities, which
may be redeemed by the Treasury before their matu-
rity; however, only noncallable securities have been
issued since 1985. Most of the marketable debt out-
standing (about 97 percent) is in the form of nominal
securities—securities for which the coupon and
principal payments are ﬁxed in dollar terms. Since
1997, the Treasury has also issued securities whose
coupon and principal payments are indexed to the
rate of inﬂation. (The indexed-securities program is
described later in the section ‘‘Availability of a New
Instrument.’’)
The Treasury also issues a considerable amount of
nonmarketable securities, which, in contrast to mar-
ketable securities, may not be traded after their initial
purchase. Nonmarketable debt is primarily in the
form of Government Account Series (83 percent),
State and Local Government Series (7 percent), and
savings bonds (7 percent). Government Account
Series securities are held mainly by off-budget gov-
ernment programs, such as social security, which by
law must invest accumulated surpluses in nonmarket-
1. Total outstanding Treasury debt, 1851–1999
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Note. Data for 1999 are through the second quarter.
Source. U.S. Department of the Treasury.
2. Ratio of total outstanding Treasury debt to gross domestic
product, 1930–99








Note. Data for 1999 are through the second quarter.
Source. U.S. Department of the Treasury; U.S. Department of Commerce.
3. Distribution of marketable Treasury debt outstanding,






Note. Numbers in parentheses are amounts outstanding, in billions of
dollars.
Source. Monthly Statement of the Public Debt of the United States (U.S.
Department of the Treasury), September 1999.
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Series (SLGS) securities are Treasury securities
offered to those governments as a result of 1969
federal legislation restricting them from investing
proceeds from tax-exempt bonds in higher-yielding
investments; yields on SLGS securities are set on a
case-by-case basis to make it possible for the pur-
chaser to comply with that legislation, although the
yields must be at least 5 basis points below the yields
on marketable Treasury securities having comparable
maturities. Savings bonds, which are issued in small
denominations, are redeemable at any time after a
short initial holding period. In addition to offering
small investors an instrument for saving, some sav-
ings bond series have special characteristics such as
indexation to the rate of inﬂation and special tax
exemptions on interest payments used to pay for
qualiﬁed higher education expenses.
Issuance of Treasury Securities:
The Primary Market
Marketable Treasury securities are issued through
regularly scheduled auctions in what is called the
primary market. The process importantly involves
the Federal Reserve Banks, which serve as conduits
for the auctions.4 Because market activity is concen-
trated in New York, the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York coordinates much of the auction activity.
Primary Dealers
Approximately 2,000 securities brokers and dealers
are registered to operate in the government securities
market.5 Although all these ﬁrms may bid at Treasury
auctions, participation is typically concentrated
among a small number of these ﬁrms, the primary
dealers. Primary dealers are selected by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York as counterparties for
open market operations (government securities trans-
actions related to the Federal Reserve’s implementa-
tion of monetary policy). They are required to partici-
pate meaningfully in both open market operations
and Treasury auctions and to provide policy-relevant
market information to the New York Reserve Bank.
Along with the consolidation of the ﬁnancial industry
has come a decline in the number of primary dealers,
from a peak of forty-six in 1988 to thirty as of
October 1999.
Auctions
To foster liquidity in the market, the Treasury issues
securities consistently and predictably through a
regular schedule of auctions. The process begins
several days before the scheduled auction when the
Treasury announces the details of the upcoming
issue, including the amount to be auctioned and the
maturity date. After the auction is announced but
before it takes place, investors begin trading the
yet-to-be-issued security in what is called the when-
issued market. Transactions in this market are agree-
ments to exchange securities and funds on the day the
new security is issued (although a considerable por-
tion of when-issued positions are unwound before the
issue date). The when-issued market allows new
Treasury issues to be efﬁciently distributed to inves-
tors and provides useful information to potential bid-
ders about the prices the Treasury may receive at the
upcoming auction.
On the day of the auction, bids may be submitted
to a Federal Reserve Bank or Branch or to the Trea-
sury’s Bureau of the Public Debt. Although all enti-
ties may submit bids for their own accounts, deposi-
tory institutions and registered government securities
brokers and dealers may also bid on behalf of their
customers. Many of these bids are entered through
TAAPS (Treasury Automated Auction Processing
System), an automated system for processing auction
bids that was implemented in the early 1990s.
Two types of bids may be submitted at the auction.
Competitive bids specify both the quantity of the
security sought and a yield.6 If the speciﬁed yield is
within the range accepted at the auction, the bidder is
awarded the entire quantity sought (unless the speci-
ﬁed yield is the highest rate accepted, in which case
the bidder is awarded a prorated portion of the bid,
4. This is one of several ways in which the Reserve Banks act as
ﬁscal agents of the Treasury, as permitted by the Federal Reserve Act.
Other ﬁscal agency services provided to the Treasury are
detailed in Gerald D. Manypenny and Michael L. Bermudez, ‘‘The
Federal Reserve Banks as Fiscal Agents and Depositories of the
United States,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 78 (October 1992),
pp. 727–37.
5. These ﬁrms are registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, as required by the Government Securities Act of 1986,
which establishes a comprehensive legal framework regulating all
government securities brokers and dealers so as to ensure the integrity
of the government securities market. The legislation focuses on the
capitalization of brokers and dealers and grants the Treasury authority
to develop and implement rules regarding transactions of government
securities. The enforcement of these rules is delegated to existing
regulatory agencies and self-regulatory organizations.
6. At bill auctions, the bidder speciﬁes a discount rate, described
below, rather than a yield.
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typically account for a small proportion of auction
amounts in part because of restrictions on their size,
do not specify a yield; instead, bidders agree to
accept the yield determined at the auction and in
return are guaranteed the amount of the security
sought.
In most auctions, noncompetitive bids must be
submitted by noon and competitive bids by 1:00 p.m.
(all times are local New York time, unless stated
otherwise). To determine the range of yields to be
accepted, the quantities speciﬁed in all noncompeti-
tive bids are summed and that total is subtracted from
the total offered. Competitive bids are then accepted
in ascending order in terms of their yields until the
quantity of accepted bids reaches the quantity offered.
Bids at the highest accepted yield, referred to as the
stop-out yield, are prorated so that the total amount
of bids accepted equals the total amount offered.
The results of the auction are typically announced by
1:30 p.m.
Since November 1998, all Treasury securities have
been auctioned according to the uniform-price
method.7 Each successful competitive bidder and
each noncompetitive bidder is awarded securities at
the price corresponding to the stop-out yield. Previ-
ously, most securities had been issued according to
the multiple-price method, meaning that securities
were awarded at prices corresponding to the yield of
each successful competitive bid. In such auctions,
bidders must be concerned with the ‘‘winner’s
curse’’—the tendency for a successful bidder to pay a
price higher than the value assessed by other auction
participants.8 By mitigating the winner’s curse, the
uniform-price auction may elicit more aggressive
bids, possibly increasing the Treasury’s revenue.
As of the end of September 1999, nominal Trea-
sury securities were offered under the following
schedule: $6.5 billion of thirteen-week bills and
$7.5 billion of twenty-six-week bills auctioned
weekly; $10 billion of ﬁfty-two-week bills every
four weeks; $15 billion of two-year notes monthly;
$15 billion of ﬁve-year notes and $12 billion of
ten-year notes quarterly; and $10 billion of thirty-
year bonds semiannually.9 The auctions of ﬁve-, ten-,
and thirty-year nominal securities are held around the
middle of the quarter and are referred to as ‘‘midquar-
ter refundings.’’ Inﬂation-indexed notes and bonds
are also brought to market quarterly. In addition to
these regularly scheduled issues, the Treasury occa-
sionally offers cash management bills—securities
having very short maturities issued to bridge tempo-
rary funding needs. The borrowing cost for cash
management bills has tended to be a bit higher than
that for regularly issued instruments.10
Instead of issuing a new security, the Treasury may
add to, or reopen, an existing issue, allowing it to
increase the outstanding amount of the issue. Securi-
ties with larger amounts outstanding tend to be more
liquid, making them more attractive to investors. The
Treasury systematically reopens Treasury bills: Every
fourth twenty-six-week bill is a reopening of a ﬁfty-
two-week bill (which is as often as possible given
the auction schedule), every thirteen-week bill is a
reopening of a twenty-six-week bill, and some cash
management bills are reopenings of other bills. In
contrast, the Treasury has only infrequently reopened
notes and bonds; since 1990, about 20 percent of the
auctions of ten-year notes and thirty-year bonds have
been reopenings. The infrequency of reopenings of
notes and bonds may be due partly to an obstacle
presented by the Internal Revenue Service’s Original
Issue Discount (OID) rule, which prevents the Trea-
sury from reopening an issue trading at a price dis-
count equal to or greater than 0.25 percent of par
value per full year of remaining maturity.11 On
November 3, 1999, the Treasury issued a temporary
rule allowing it to reopen securities within one year
of issuance regardless of the size of the discount.
The Treasury has adjusted the auction schedule
over time in keeping with its changing ﬁnancing
needs (table 1). It has stopped issuing securities at
those maturities it judged to be less popular with
investors, preferring to concentrate issuance in fewer
maturities in order to preserve the sizes of those
issues. In particular, it canceled the twenty-year bond
in 1986, the four-year note in 1990, the seven-year
note in 1993, and the three-year note in 1998. It also
recently reduced the frequency of issuance of the
ﬁve-year note from monthly to quarterly and the
frequency of issuance of the thirty-year bond from
three times to twice a year by eliminating the Novem-
ber auction. The Treasury has discussed possible
7. Before that time, the Treasury conducted uniform-price auctions
for some of its issues, including two- and ﬁve-year notes. See box
‘‘Regulatory Reforms.’’
8. Vincent Reinhart, ‘‘An Analysis of Potential Treasury Auction
Techniques,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 78 (June 1992),
pp. 403–13.
9. These totals do not reﬂect quantities allocated to the Federal
Reserve or to foreign ofﬁcial institutions.
10. David Simon, ‘‘Segmentation in the Treasury Market: Evi-
dence from Cash Management Bills,’’ Journal of Financial and Quan-
titative Analysis, vol. 26 (March 1991), pp. 97–108.
11. The OID rule does not apply if the Treasury declares an acute,
protracted shortage in a security. See box ‘‘Regulatory Reforms.’’
788 Federal Reserve Bulletin December 1999future cutbacks in the issuance of one-year bills and
two-year notes as well.
Changes in the auction schedule have naturally
affected the maturity of outstanding Treasury debt.
The average maturity of marketable debt has varied
considerably over the past three decades (chart 4).
More recently, the maturity peaked at about six years
at the beginning of the 1990s, after which the Trea-
sury began to shorten the maturity in an attempt to
reduce its borrowing costs. Over the past several
years, the maturity has again begun to rise as a result
of a reduction in the issuance of securities having
shorter maturities (discussed in the section ‘‘Reduc-
tion in the Supply of Nominal Treasury Debt’’). The
elimination of the November thirty-year bond auction
may help counter this rise.
Trading in Treasury Securities:
The Secondary Market
The market for government securities is an over-the-
counter market in which participants trade with one
another on a bilateral basis rather than on an orga-
nized exchange. (Treasury securities are ofﬁcially reg-
istered at the New York Stock Exchange, but trading
in that market is negligible.) Trading activity takes
place between primary dealers, non–primary dealers,
and customers of these dealers, including ﬁnancial
institutions, nonﬁnancial institutions, and individuals.
Many dealers, particularly the primary dealers,
‘‘make markets’’ in Treasury securities by standing
ready to buy and sell securities at speciﬁed prices. In
the process of making markets, dealers purchase
securities at the bid price and sell the same securities
at a slightly higher price, the offer price. Through
these sales and purchases, the dealer can facilitate
transactions between customers while taking only
temporary positions in the security. In doing so, the
dealer earns the difference between the bid and offer
prices, referred to as the bid–offer spread.
In addition to transacting directly with customers,
primary dealers frequently trade with one another.
The majority of transactions between primary dealers
and other large market participants take place through
the six interdealer brokers. These brokers provide the
dealers with electronic screens that display the best
bid and offer prices among the dealers. Dealers can
execute trades through an interdealer broker—either
‘‘hitting’’ a bid price or ‘‘taking’’ an offer price—for
a small fee. In this structure, the interdealer brokers
provide two important services: They disseminate
price and trade information efﬁciently and provide
anonymity to market participants.
1. Frequency of auctions of Treasury securities, by maturity, 1985–99
Year
Type of security
13-week 26-week 52-week 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year 7-year 10-year 20-year 30-year
1985 ..... Weekly Weekly Every 4th Monthly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly





1991 ..... (12/31/90) Monthly
1992 ..... (1/31/91)
1993 ..... None Semiannually
1994 ..... (4/15/93) (8/16/93)
1995 .....
1996 ..... 6 ´/yr (7/15/96) 3´/yr (8/15/96)
1997 ..... Quarterly
1998 ..... None Quarterly (8/15/97)
1999 ..... (5/15/98) (8/17/98) Semiannually1
Note. Date indicates when a security was ﬁrst issued under a new schedule
or, if discontinued, when a security was last issued.
1. In August 1999, the Treasury announced that it would discontinue the
November auction and issue 30-year bonds in February and August only.
Source. Treasury Bulletin.
4. Average maturity of marketable Treasury debt,
1964–99






Note. Excludes inﬂation-indexed securities and holdings of the Federal
Reserve. Data for 1999 are through September.
Source. U.S. Department of the Treasury.
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active participants in the secondary market. In the
second quarter of 1999, they engaged in an average
of $193 billion in transactions in Treasury securities
each day (table 2)—about $105 billion with other
dealers through interdealer brokers and the other
$88 billion either with customers or directly with
other dealers.12 This activity is fairly concentrated:
The six primary dealers with the highest volume of
transactions in Treasury securities accounted for
about 50 percent of the primary dealers’ trading
activity.
Treasury securities can be traded almost around the
clock (about twenty-two hours a day). Trading begins
in Tokyo at 7:30 p.m. (New York time) and continues
until 3:00 a.m., when it passes to the London mar-
ket.13 Trading in London continues until 7:30 a.m., at
which time it begins in New York, where it continues
until 5:30 p.m. Although market activity is world-
wide, about 94 percent of the trading volume trans-
acted through interdealer brokers takes place during
New York trading hours, leaving about 4 percent and
2 percent of volume during London and Tokyo hours
respectively.14 Moreover, according to market partici-
pants, a signiﬁcant portion of overseas trading occurs
at times when trading operations are being shifted
from one market to another.15 Overseas markets for
Treasury securities appear to be less liquid than U.S.
markets; dealers reportedly post wider bid–offer
spreads and stand ready to buy or sell smaller
amounts of securities at the posted prices.16 The ﬁnal
exchange of securities for cash (settlement) typically
occurs in New York, regardless of where the transac-
tion originated.
Quoting Conventions
Treasury coupon securities are quoted in terms of
their price, expressed in dollars. The quoted price of a
coupon security is the ‘‘clean price,’’ which excludes
accrued interest. When a transaction takes place, the
purchaser must pay the seller the clean price plus the
accrued interest, which is determined by the coupon
amount multiplied by the fraction of the coupon
period that has passed.
The value of a Treasury coupon security is often
expressed in terms of its yield to maturity, or yield,
rather than its price. The yield on a Treasury security
is the constant interest rate at which the present
discounted value of future coupon and principal pay-
ments equals the current price of the security. In
effect, the yield represents the rate of return an inves-
tor would earn if he or she held the security to
maturity, assuming semiannual compounding of
interest. By deﬁnition, the yield and the price move in
opposite directions: An increase in the price implies
that an investor must pay more today to receive the
same, ﬁxed payments in the future, and therefore the
rate of return, or the yield, on the initial investment
is lower. Although levels of yields are expressed in
percentage points, researchers and market partici-
pants often express changes in yields in basis points
(hundredths of a percentage point).
In contrast to coupon securities, Treasury bills are
quoted in terms of a discount rate, which is the
difference between the face value and the market
price as a percentage of the face value, scaled to an
annual rate assuming a 360-day year (that is, multi-
plied by 360 and divided by the number of days
remaining to maturity). The yield to maturity for a
Treasury bill is the difference between the face value
and the market price as a percentage of the market
price, scaled to an annual rate using the actual num-
ber of days in the year.
12. In comparing these ﬁgures, note that dealer-to-dealer transac-
tions are counted twice.
13. To be precise, because Japan has not adopted daylight saving
time, the market opens in Tokyo at 7:30 p.m. eastern daylight time or
6:30 p.m. eastern standard time.
14. Michael J. Fleming, ‘‘The Round-the-Clock Market for U.S.
Treasury Securities,’’ Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Economic
Policy Review, vol. 3 (July 1997), pp. 9–32. This analysis is based on
1994 data; preliminary analysis by the author using 1998 data does not
suggest signiﬁcant changes in the patterns of overseas trading of
Treasury securities.
15. Brian Madigan, and Jeff Stehm, ‘‘An Overview of the Second-
ary Market for U.S. Treasury Securities in London and Tokyo,’’
Finance and Economics Discussion Series 94–17 (Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, Divisions of Research and
Statistics and Monetary Affairs, July 1994).
16. Michael J. Fleming, ‘‘The Round-the-Clock Market for U.S.
Treasury Securities’’; also Market Liquidity: Research Findings and
Selected Policy Implications, Committee on the Global Financial
System, Bank for International Settlements (May 1999).








Bills .......................... 29,451 44
Coupon securities ............. 162,614 52
Indexed securities ............. 1,282 74
Total ....................... 193,347 51
Note. The most active primary dealers are the six with the highest volume of
transactions in each type of security during the quarter.
Source. Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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Recordkeeping for Treasury securities is done in one
of two ways. In one system, ownership and legal
interests are recorded electronically, in a series of
book-entry records on the books of the Federal
Reserve Banks and depository institutions: The Fed-
eral Reserve manages the National Book-Entry Sys-
tem (NBES), which maintains records for depository
institutions; depository institutions, in turn, maintain
records for their customers. Alternatively, an investor
can maintain a book-entry securities account directly
with the Treasury through the Treasury Direct sys-
tem. The securities held in Treasury Direct are pur-
chased when originally issued and are typically held
to maturity.
Through the NBES, depository institutions can
electronically transfer Treasury securities among
themselves to settle their trades and the trades of their
customers. Most of these trades are settled on a
delivery-versus-payment basis whereby the securities
are electronically deposited in the receiving insti-
tution’s account and the corresponding payment is
simultaneously electronically deposited in the send-
ing institution’s account at the Federal Reserve. The
depository institutions, in turn, adjust their custom-
ers’ records to reﬂect the transfer.
To facilitate the settlement process, the Federal
Reserve grants ﬁnality when securities transfers are
completed over the NBES—that is, the payments
associated with these transactions are ﬁnal and irrevo-
cable. In addition, the Federal Reserve, for a fee,
provides intraday credit, commonly called daylight
overdrafts, to ﬁnancially healthy depository institu-
tions. To limit the credit risk arising from such credit
extensions, the Federal Reserve imposes limits, based
on several factors, on depository institutions’ day-
light overdraft capacity. The Federal Reserve requires
that depository institutions cover their daylight over-
drafts by the end of the day. If a depository institution
ends the day with a negative account balance, the
institution incurs an overnight overdraft, which car-
ries a much higher fee than a daylight overdraft.
Because only depository institutions have access to
the NBES, other buyers and sellers of government
securities must use a depository institution as an
intermediary.17 Settlement activity is highly concen-
trated in a few depository institutions known as clear-
ing banks. Clearing banks tend to be very large
organizations because sizable investments in com-
puter hardware and software are necessary to handle
the large ﬂow of transactions. These banks also
extend intraday credit to their customers, allowing
them to overdraw their money accounts to pay for
securities. To ﬁnance their intraday lending to cus-
tomers, clearing banks rely on daylight overdraft
credit from the Federal Reserve. The charges for
daylight credit are then typically passed on by the
clearing banks to their customers.
THE DEMAND FOR TREASURY SECURITIES
The supply of Treasury securities, as noted earlier, is
largely a function of the need to ﬁnance the cumula-
tive budget deﬁcits of the U.S. government. The
demand for those securities is determined largely by
their usefulness for investment and hedging purposes.
Treasury Securities in Investors’ Portfolios
Treasury securities are held by various types of inves-
tors, including domestic ﬁnancial intermediaries such
as depository institutions; institutional investors; state
and local governments; international investors; and
the Federal Reserve System, which participates
actively in the market as part of its implementation of
monetary policy (chart 5).
The widespread holding of Treasury securities is
an indication of several appealing characteristics. As
with other ﬁxed-income products, the payments on
17. Some government-sponsored enterprises also have access to
the NBES.













Note. Numbers in parentheses are amounts, in billions of dollars. Excludes
interest-bearing public debt held in U.S. government accounts (mainly invest-
ments in the social security and federal retirement trust funds). For state and
local governments, includes about $167.45 billion of nonmarketable Treasury
debt. Institutional investors include insurance companies, mutual funds, and
pension funds.
Source. Treasury Bulletin, September 1999, tables OFS-1, OFS-2.
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providing the investor with a known stream of
income. (Investors who prefer a single future pay-
ment rather than a stream of coupon payments may
instead hold STRIPS, described in the box ‘‘The
Treasury STRIPS Market.’’) Fixed-income securities
are often an important component of well-balanced
portfolios that seek to minimize the variance of
returns for a given expected return.
Treasury securities are particularly appealing to
investors because they offer greater safety and liquid-
ity than other ﬁxed-income securities. The payments
of principal and interest on the securities are backed
by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government. In
light of the sound ﬁnancial history of the federal
government and its ability to raise substantial tax
revenues, Treasury securities are considered to have
the lowest risk of default of any major ﬁnancial
investment in the world. Moreover, the interest
income derived from Treasury securities is exempt
from state and local taxes. In addition, some Treasury
securities are extremely liquid, which may be particu-
larly important to investors engaging in hedging and
other trading-intensive investment activities. Demand
arising from such activities is not spread evenly
across all Treasury securities but is concentrated in
a limited number of issues with superior liquidity
(as discussed in the section ‘‘Factors Affecting Indi-
vidual Treasury Securities’’).
Liquidity is an important factor inﬂuencing the
Federal Reserve’s holdings of Treasury securities as
well. The Federal Reserve tends to hold Treasury
securities having maturities shorter than the average
maturity of marketable securities held by other inves-
tors, partly because securities having shorter maturi-
ties tend to be more liquid and because it can fairly
The Treasury STRIPS Market
Although regular coupon payments may suit the needs of
some investors, others may prefer securities offering a
single payment when the security matures. These instru-
ments, called zero-coupon securities, sell at a discount to
their face value, allowing investors to realize a return from
the increase in the price of the instrument to its maturity
date.
In 1985 the Treasury initiated a program that allows
investors to split a Treasury note or bond into zero-coupon
securities, or STRIPS, corresponding to each coupon pay-
ment and the principal payment of the underlying security.1
For example, stripping a Treasury bond that has twenty
years left to maturity generates forty coupon STRIPS, one
maturing every six months for twenty years, and one princi-
pal STRIP maturing in twenty years. The ﬁnal coupon
STRIP and the principal STRIP are treated as distinct
securities despite having identical maturity dates. Since the
inception of the program, all newly issued ten-year notes
and thirty-year bonds have been eligible for stripping. The
program was expanded in September 1997 to include all
two-, three-, and ﬁve-year notes as well.
The program also allows (as of 1987) the reconstitution
of a stripped security from STRIPS matching all the securi-
ty’s coupon and principal payments. The principal payment
needed to reconstitute a Treasury security must be gener-
ated from the principal STRIP originating from the security
being reconstituted. By contrast, the coupon payment stream
may be created from coupon STRIPS derived from any
security; that is, coupon STRIPS with the same maturity
date are fungible.
1. STRIPS is an acronym for Separate Trading of Registered Interest and
Principal of Securities.
The considerable interest in zero-coupon securities was
evident long before the advent of the STRIPS program.
Several investment banks began holding Treasury securities
with custodians in special trust accounts and selling the
components of those securities to investors. The STRIPS
program made this process more efﬁcient and cost-effective,
as STRIPS could be registered in the Federal Reserve’s
book-entry system in the same manner as other Treasury
securities.
The total amount of STRIPS outstanding increased rap-
idly following the introduction of the program, reaching
$200 billion by 1993 before leveling out. Stripping activity
has been concentrated in longer-term securities, possibly
because stripping makes it possible to create Treasury secu-
rities having longer duration than available from coupon-
bearing Treasury securities, which may be of interest to
investors having very long investment horizons. At the end
of September 1999, about 32 percent of all outstanding
Treasury bonds were held in stripped form. Stripping activ-
ity has been more limited for securities having shorter
maturities, in part because stripping simply replicates many
of the zero-coupon securities that are created by stripping
longer-term securities.
The STRIPS market is characterized by heavy ﬂows of
gross stripping and reconstitution activity, with an average
of about $11 billion of securities stripped and reconstituted
each month over the ﬁrst three quarters of 1999. Stripping
and reconstitution transactions can be implemented rela-
tively quickly and at very little cost, facilitating arbitrage
between the markets. As a result, there is a relatively tight
pricing relationship between a strippable Treasury security
and its stripped components.
792 Federal Reserve Bulletin December 1999rapidly reduce the size of its holdings of such securi-
ties, should it need to, by merely not replacing matur-
ing holdings. The advantages of holding a liquid
portfolio became evident in 1984 when the Federal
Reserve had to sell a signiﬁcant amount of Treasury
securities to offset the massive inﬂux of reserves into
the banking system provided through a large volume
of discount-window loans at the time.18 The Federal
Reserve reduced the maturity of its portfolio from
about four years in 1985 to about three years in 1991.
In 1992, the Federal Reserve’s policymaking commit-
tee decided that the portfolio had reached a sufﬁcient
level of liquidity and instructed the trading desk at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to keep the
average maturity from falling further. In the follow-
ing years, because of the paydown of Treasury bills
outstanding, the average maturity crept back up to
about four years.
Overall, Treasury securities may appeal to inves-
tors seeking the safety and liquidity offered by those
securities, and the securities’ prices are determined
by the value investors ascribe to those characteristics
in the context of their investment strategies.
Determinants of the Yield Curve
The values of Treasury securities are often summa-
rized by the yield curve, which plots the yields of
all noncallable securities against their maturities. An
example is the yield curve on September 23, 1999
(chart 6). This curve has an upward-sloping, concave
shape. Securities having maturities of less than ﬁve
years are highly concentrated because shorter-term
securities are auctioned more frequently and because
many previously issued longer-term securities fall
in that maturity range. The gap between noncallable
securities having maturities of ten years and ﬁfteen
years arises because the Treasury switched from issu-
ing twenty-year bonds to issuing thirty-year bonds in
the mid-1980s.
Securities having similar maturities tend to have
similar yields because they offer ﬁxed payments over
similar periods. Securities having very different matu-
rities are also linked. In particular, longer-term inter-
est rates generally reﬂect expectations about the
future path of short-term interest rates. This relation-
ship, which is often referred to as the expectations
hypothesis, arises because an investor can choose
among several strategies, including purchasing a
Treasury security whose maturity extends over his or
her investment horizon or purchasing a short-term
security and continuing to reinvest in that security
(that is, roll it over) through the investment period.19
The former strategy offers a return equal to the yield
on the longer-term security, whereas the latter offers
a return determined, approximately, by the average of
the yields on the short-term security over the invest-
ment horizon.20 Substitution between the two strate-
gies tends to keep the expected returns from the two
strategies close to one another, although not exactly
equal because of differences in risk (discussed
below).
Yields on short-term Treasury securities are impor-
tantly inﬂuenced by monetary policy decisions by the
Federal Reserve. Under current operating procedures,
the Federal Reserve sets a target level for the federal
funds rate—the rate at which depository institutions
make uncollateralized overnight loans to one another.
Yields on short-term securities do not deviate sub-
stantially from that rate because the institutions are
able to substitute between making short-term loans in
the federal funds market and purchasing Treasury
securities having very short maturities.21
Longer-term yields, because they reﬂect expecta-
tions of future short-term yields, can be signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced by the outlook for monetary policy. For
18. Cheryl L. Edwards, ‘‘Open Market Operations in the 1990s,’’
Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 83 (November 1997), pp. 859–74.
19. The vast literature on the yield curve includes alternative
versions of the expectations hypothesis as well as many criticisms.
This article merely notes a general relationship between longer-term
yields and expectations about future short-term interest rates without
taking a stand on any particular variant of the expectations hypothesis.
20. Rates on longer-term Treasury securities are actually related to
a weighted average of future short-term rates, where the pattern of the
weights is determined by the size of the coupon payment on the
longer-term instrument.
21. The relationship between yields on short-term Treasury securi-
ties and the federal funds rate is not exact, in part because of
differences in tax treatment and credit risk.
6. Yield curve for Treasury securities, September 23, 1999
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ary 2, 1994, prior to a sequence of monetary policy
tightenings that hiked the federal funds rate target
3 percentage points over the next twelve months
(chart 7). In contrast, on June 16, 1989, yields on
long-term bonds were below those on short-term
securities before a sequence of policy easings that cut
the target federal funds rate about 31⁄2 percentage
points over the subsequent twenty-four months.
Some differences in yields on Treasury securities
are not related to expected future movements in inter-
est rates. These differences for the most part reﬂect
compensation for risk and are often referred to as
term premia. Although they are viewed as free of
default risk, Treasury securities involve interest rate
risk, as movements in their yields generate capital
gains or losses for investors.22 The uncertainty sur-
rounding the return from holding a Treasury security
depends on the amount of variation in the yield on
that security and on the sensitivity of the price of the
security to changes in yields. The latter is determined
by the duration of the security, which is given by a
mathematical formula that summarizes how far into
the future, on average, the payments of a security are
to be made. The duration of a zero-coupon bond,
because it makes only a single payment, equals its
maturity. The duration of a coupon-bearing security,
because it makes coupon payments before it matures,
is less than its maturity.
Longer-term bonds tend to have more interest rate
risk because they have longer duration. Intuitively,
the price of these securities must change more for a
given change in yield because the change in yield
must be realized over a longer period. The effects of
longer duration are evident in table 3, which presents
some summary statistics on yields and one-month
holding returns (including coupon payments and
capital gains or losses) for securities with differ-
ent maturities. Yields tend to vary less as the securi-
ty’s maturity increases, indicating (according to the
expectations hypothesis) that many of the movements
in shorter-term yields are expected to be transitory.
However, this pattern is more than offset by differ-
ences in the duration of the securities, so that over
the period considered, the standard deviation of the
holding return for the thirty-year bond was nearly
ﬁve times greater than that for the two-year note.
Because investors typically demand a premium for
bearing additional risk, longer-term Treasury securi-
ties, on average, offer higher yields than shorter-term
instruments.23 Indeed, for this sample the average
22. Some of the movements in yields may occur in response to
expected changes in inﬂation. Unexpected movements in inﬂation that
are not reﬂected in Treasury yields also present a risk to investors by
eroding the purchasing power of the returns on the security. The risks
presented by inﬂation are discussed in more detail in the section on
inﬂation-indexed securities.
23. The amount of variation in holding returns is not necessarily
the measure of risk considered by investors. Most ﬁnance models
indicate that the covariance of holding returns with the returns on
other assets or with changes in consumption determines the risk
premium on an asset.
7. Yield curve for Treasury securities
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Two-year note ..... 1.81 6.24 30.2 1.93
Five-year note ..... 4.29 6.72 29.9 4.27
Ten-year note ..... 6.91 7.03 26.9 6.43
Thirty-year bond .. 11.95 7.34 23.1 9.39
Note. Data are for the most recently issued security in each maturity class.
1. Standard deviation of monthly holding returns expressed at an annual rate,
assuming that monthly returns are independent across time.
Source. Federal Reserve Bank of New York; authors’ calculations.
794 Federal Reserve Bulletin December 1999yield on the thirty-year bond was more than a full
percentage point higher than that on the two-year
note. In general, the greater risk of holding longer-
term securities imparts an upward-sloping shape to
the yield curve.
The expected return from holding a Treasury secu-
rity depends not only on the level of its yield but also
on the volatility of its yield. The reason is that the
increase in the price of the security resulting from a
decline in its yield is greater in magnitude than the
decrease in the price resulting from a equal-size rise
in its yield. If the uncertainty surrounding future
yield changes is symmetric, potential capital gains
will exceed potential capital losses, increasing the
expected return. As a result, the yield on a Treasury
security can fall below its expected return by the
amount that is gained from the imbalance in potential
returns. The magnitude of this effect—often referred
to as the convexity premium—increases with the
security’s maturity. The convexity premium is often
thought to add curvature to the shape of the yield




Although the factors described in the preceding sec-
tion largely determine the overall shape of the yield
curve, there is also considerable variation among the
yields on individual Treasury securities having simi-
lar maturities. Some of this variation reﬂects addi-
tional characteristics of the Treasury market that
affect the yields of particular securities.
Liquidity
Overall, the Treasury market is extraordinarily liquid.
Enormous amounts of securities are traded every day.
Even counting only the transactions of the primary
dealers, the value of the entire stock of marketable
Treasury debt would turn over completely in about
three weeks. The considerable trading volume allows
market participants to move in and out of large
Treasury positions rapidly with little effect on the
prices of those securities. Because of the extensive
trading and the high degree of competition and trans-
parency among dealers, dealers typically make mar-
kets in Treasury securities at narrow bid–offer
spreads. Bid–offer spreads for Treasury securities are
reported to be 1.6¢ or less per $100 face value. By
comparison, bid–offer spreads for investment-grade
corporate bonds average about 13.3¢ and for high-
yield corporate bonds, 19.1¢.24
The liquidity of the Treasury market is not evenly
distributed across securities, however. Most of the
trading activity takes place in on-the-run issues—the
most recently issued securities in a particular matu-
rity class. The difference in trading volume between
on-the-run securities and previously issued (off-the-
run) securities is striking. In recent years, more than
half of reported interdealer broker trading in nominal
Treasury debt, on average, took place in on-the-run
securities, even though off-the-run issues outnum-
bered on-the-run issues more than twenty to one.25
Because of the remarkable liquidity of on-the-run
Treasury securities, some investors are willing to pay
a premium for (that is, accept a lower yield for) those
securities compared with similar, off-the-run securi-
ties. The preference for liquidity was evident in the
number of securities trading at yields that deviated
from the rest of the yield curve on September 23,
1999 (chart 6). Yields on recently issued ﬁve-, ten-,
and thirty-year securities were well below those on
off-the-run securities with similar maturities. In con-
trast, some securities traded at yields notably above
the curve, including long-ago-issued twenty-year
bonds that are much less liquid.26 At times, the mar-
ket’s preference for liquidity becomes acute, and
spreads between on-the-run and off-the-run issues
widen appreciably, as observed during the market
turmoil in fall 1998 (see box ‘‘The Flight to Quality
and Treasury Yields’’).
Hedging Demand
Treasury securities are also commonly used as hedg-
ing instruments, primarily to offset the interest rate
risk inherent in positions in other ﬁxed-income secu-
rities. Dealers often have positions in other ﬁxed-
income products, including corporate debt securities
and mortgage-backed securities, arising in part from
their role in issuing and making markets in such
securities. Dealers may also choose to establish large
24. Figures for corporate debt securities are from G. Hong and
A. Warga, ‘‘An Empirical Study of Bond Market Transactions,’’
Financial Analysts Journal (forthcoming).
25. Volume data are collected by GovPX, a joint venture of
primary dealers and some interdealer brokers that reports data on
transactions taking place through ﬁve of the six interdealer brokers.
Reported trading volume primarily captures dealer-to-dealer trades.
Retail and institutional investors may trade off-the-run issues in
greater proportion than dealers.
26. Market participants may also be reluctant to hold the twenty-
year bonds because institutional considerations may make it less
appealing to purchase securities that have coupon rates well above
current yields.
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part of their portfolio strategies.
To hedge the interest rate risk associated with those
positions, dealers frequently take short positions
in Treasury securities. As described in more detail
below, the short position is established by selling
securities that the dealer does not own but instead
borrows, with the intention of purchasing those secu-
rities at a later time. By doing so, the dealer proﬁts
if yields rise, which could offset some of the
losses incurred in long positions in other ﬁxed-
income securities.
Several characteristics of Treasury securities make
them well suited for hedging positions in other ﬁxed-
income products. Probably most important is their
remarkable liquidity. Because their balance sheet
positions can change rapidly, dealers want to be able
to quickly alter their holdings of the hedging instru-
ment in order to maintain the proper hedges. There-
fore, a preferred hedging instrument is one that can
be traded quickly and at little cost. A second char-
acteristic is that dealers can readily establish short
positions in these instruments at reasonable costs
because the repo market in Treasury securities is
active (discussed in the next section).
Of course, Treasury securities and their derivatives
do not offer a perfect hedge against movements in the
value of other types of debt instruments. This became
The Flight to Quality and Treasury Yields
Treasury securities generally have lower yields than other
ﬁxed-income products because of their safety and liquidity.
At times, the market’s concern about risk and liquidity has
become pronounced, resulting in a ‘‘ﬂight to quality’’ into
Treasury securities despite their lower yields.
Such a ﬂight occurred in the fall of 1998. After the
devaluation of the Russian ruble in August of that year and
subsequent difﬁculties in other emerging-market econo-
mies, investors’ aversion toward risk appeared to intensify.
That sentiment was reinforced by the prospect of a default
by Long-Term Capital Management, a prominent hedge
fund that in August and September had sustained sharp
losses from its investment positions. By generating sizable
losses for the ﬁrm’s counterparties and forcing the abrupt
unwinding of the ﬁrm’s extensive positions in the Treasury
and other markets, a default could have signiﬁcantly dis-
rupted markets.1
Liquidity in many markets declined sharply over this
period, with bid–offer spreads widening and large transac-
tions becoming more difﬁcult to complete. Anecdotal
reports suggest that bid–offer spreads on Treasury securities
widened from their normal levels of 1.6¢ or less per $100 to
as high as 16¢ for on-the-run issues and 25¢ for off-the-run
issues. Moreover, investors showed a dramatic preference
for the greater liquidity offered by on-the-run issues. Yield
spreads between the most recently issued and second most
recently issued securities (the liquidity premium on on-the-
run securities) widened sharply, as investors were willing to
hold the more liquid securities at lower yields (chart).
The increased concern about liquidity and the reduced
willingness of investors to bear risk also caused a widening
of spreads between other ﬁxed-income securities and Trea-
sury securities. The widening affected even highly rated
1. Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Man-
agement, Report of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets
(April 1999).
debt. Market strains began to subside following the Federal
Reserve intermeeting policy easing on October 15, 1998.
Soon thereafter, bid–offer spreads on Treasury securities,
premiums for on-the-run issues, and yield spreads between
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796 Federal Reserve Bulletin December 1999apparent in the fall of 1998, when investors became
increasingly concerned about the safety and liquidity
of their investments.27 The ensuing ‘‘ﬂight to qual-
ity’’ (see box) pushed down yields on Treasury secu-
rities sharply relative to yields on corporate and
mortgage-backed debt securities (some of which
actually rose), generating large losses in short posi-
tions in Treasury securities that were not offset by
gains in other ﬁxed-income securities. Since that
time, market participants have evinced an increasing
reliance on non–Treasury securities for their hedg-
ing needs, including debt issued by government-
sponsored enterprises.
Related Markets
The demand for Treasury securities is also impor-
tantly affected by the markets for repurchase agree-
ments and derivatives.
Repurchase Agreements
Dealers and other investors often establish short posi-
tions in Treasury securities as part of their hedging
activity or, more generally, as part of their portfolio
strategies. To establish short positions, they sell secu-
rities they do not own and deliver those securities to
the purchaser by obtaining them in the market for
repurchase agreements, the repo market.
The repo market allows participants to exchange
funds and securities on a temporary basis—in effect,
borrowing and lending using Treasury and other debt
securities as collateral. More speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm
engaging in a repo transaction simultaneously sells a
particular security to a counterparty and agrees to
repurchase that same security at a speciﬁed price at a
later date, often the next day. This ﬁrm is said to
‘‘repo out’’ the security, by which it borrows money
at what is called the repo rate, which is based on the
difference between the current price and the agreed-to
future price. A reverse repo is simply the other side
of the transaction—agreeing to purchase particular
securities temporarily and to resell them to the same
counterparty at a speciﬁed price at a later date. In this
case, the ﬁrm ‘‘reverses in’’ the security.
Investors can therefore deliver securities that they
sold short by reversing in the securities repeatedly
until they decide to cover the position by purchasing
the securities outright. On the other side, investors
frequently rely on the repo market to ﬁnance their
long positions in Treasury securities by repoing out
those securities. Partly as a result of these activities,
trading volume in the repo market is heavy: Primary
dealers reported about $1.2 trillion of lending and
borrowing in the repo market on their balance sheets
as of October 20, 1999.
Most repo transactions involving Treasury securi-
ties take place at what is called the general-collateral
repo rate. This interest rate typically follows the
federal funds rate closely, as depository institutions
can use either market as a source of overnight ﬁnanc-
ing.28 However, if the demand for a particular Trea-
sury security in the repo market is sufﬁciently high,
or if the supply of that security is limited, the repo
rate for that security can fall below the general-
collateral repo rate. In such a case, the security is said
to go ‘‘on special’’ in the repo market. The ﬁrm
reversing in the desired security is willing to pay a
cost to obtain that security by letting the holder of the
security borrow at an interest rate below the general
market rate.
This situation frequently arises in on-the-run Trea-
sury securities, as these issues are heavily used in
establishing short positions for hedging and other
purposes, resulting in considerable demand for them
in the repo market. The repo rate for the on-the-run
ten-year note has often fallen several percentage
points below the general-collateral repo rate (chart 8).
Researchers have found that the ‘‘specialness’’ of an
on-the-run issue—the difference between its repo rate
and the general-collateral rate—tends to build follow-
ing an auction as a larger proportion of the issue
comes to be held by investors who do not make the
security available to the repo market. The specialness
typically peaks around the announcement of the next
auction, after which it declines as short positions
begin to shift to the next on-the-run issue.29 In addi-
tion to this regular pattern, other factors inﬂuence
the specialness of these securities. For example,
increased hedging activity around periods of heavy
issuance of corporate debt or mortgage-backed secu-
rities can lead to sizable short positions that cause
particular securities to go on special in the repo
market.
Securities that are on special in the repo market
frequently trade at lower yields (higher prices) than
27. A Review of Financial Market Events in Autumn 1998, Com-
mittee on the Global Financial System, Bank for International Settle-
ments (October 1999).
28. The main difference between the transactions is that a repo
transaction is akin to a collateralized loan, whereas a federal funds
transaction is an uncollateralized loan.
29. Frank Keane, ‘‘Repo Rate Patterns for New Treasury Notes,’’
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Current Issues in Economics and
Finance, vol. 2 (September 1996).
The Treasury Securities Market: Overview and Recent Developments 797other securities with comparable maturities, as is
often the case for on-the-run Treasury securities.30 If
a security is on special in the repo market, holders
can realize a proﬁt by borrowing against the security
at below-market rates; because this proﬁt increases
the return on the security for a given yield, investors
may be willing to hold the security at a lower yield.
However, investors that value the greater liquidity of
on-the-run securities may be willing to hold them
without repoing them out despite their lower yields.
The patterns observed around Treasury auctions,
which reﬂect the activity associated with bringing
new issues to market, account for a signiﬁcant por-
tion of the movements in yields and repo rates for the
most recently issued securities. However, extensive
specialness in the repo market has at times also
signaled severe shortages of particular Treasury secu-
rities that have disrupted the effective functioning of
the market for those securities. Several such short-
ages took place around the time that Salomon Broth-
ers admitted in 1991 to repeated violations of Trea-
sury auction rules. In response, several regulatory
and policy changes were implemented to prevent
violations of auction rules and to alleviate such
shortages if they develop (see box ‘‘Regulatory
Reforms’’).
To facilitate transactions in the repo market, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York operates a securi-
ties lending program that allows primary dealers to
borrow individual Treasury securities from the Fed-
eral Reserve’s portfolio overnight by posting a differ-
ent Treasury security as collateral. The program uses
a competitive auction format. Under the current struc-
ture, initiated on April 26, 1999, the Bank conducts a
daily auction at which it accepts bids in terms of a
‘‘lending fee’’ for borrowing particular securities.
When a bid is accepted, the particular security is
delivered to the dealer’s account. The dealer, in turn,
delivers a different Treasury security to the Federal
Reserve as collateral and pays the lending fee. The
lending fee is closely related to the spread between
the general-collateral repo rate and the repo rate for
the borrowed security, because from the dealer’s
perspective the transaction is similar to repoing out
a (general-collateral) security and reversing in the
desired security. The minimum bid is 150 basis
points, high enough that borrowing activity is limited
to those securities that are scarce, and hence deeply
on special, in the repo market.
The Federal Reserve’s portfolio of Treasury securi-
ties as of October 31 of this year totaled $492 billion.
By making a portion of these holdings available for
borrowing, the securities lending program increases
the potential supply of Treasury securities available
to the repo market, which should help reduce the
scarcity of particular issues. The Federal Reserve
originally stood ready to lend up to 25 percent of its
holdings of any security but on September 7, 1999,
increased the limit to 45 percent. Over the two
months following the increase, dealers borrowed an
average of about $1.4 billion of Treasury securities,
typically distributed across several different securi-
ties, every business day.
Derivatives
A large and active market exists for derivative securi-
ties whose values are based on the prices of Treasury
30. For a discussion of the repo market and its effects on Treasury
yields, see Darrell Dufﬁe, ‘‘Special Repo Rates,’’ Journal of Finance,
vol. 51 (June 1996), pp. 493–526.
8. Overnight repo rates for Treasury securities, 1995–99







Note. Data are daily and extend from November 7, 1995, to October 22,
1999.
Source. Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
798 Federal Reserve Bulletin December 1999securities. Futures and options contracts for two-,
ﬁve-, and ten-year notes and for bonds are listed by
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), and similar
futures contracts are offered on the Cantor Financial
Futures Exchange. In addition, the Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange offers options and futures on various
Treasury bills and other short-term interest rate
products.
As of the end of October 1999, open interest for
CBOT long-bond futures (that is, the total number of
contracts held by market participants) was about
635,000, with each contract based on $100,000 face
value of the Treasury bond. Daily trading volume in
these contracts over the month averaged about
300,000 contracts. The CBOT also offers trading in
options on Treasury futures (contracts that allow the
Regulatory Reforms Following Violations of Auction Rules by Salomon Brothers
Following the April and May 1991 Treasury auctions, sev-
eral widely publicized ‘‘short squeezes’’ occurred in the
two-year note during which an apparent scarcity of the
securities caused their yields and repo rates to fall substan-
tially below those for other Treasury securities. The infor-
mation available to the Treasury suggested that the May
squeeze had resulted from a concentration of auction awards
to Salomon Brothers and some of its customers. In addition,
there had earlier been inquiries into several Salomon Broth-
ers bids at the February 1991 auction of the ﬁve-year note
that appeared to violate the rule limiting the amount bid by
a single bidder to 35 percent of the publicly offered amount.
These events prompted investigations by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice, leading Salomon Broth-
ers to conduct its own investigation. In August 1991, the
ﬁrm admitted to submitting unauthorized customer bids at
several auctions in 1990 and 1991 and to failing to report
large net long positions on auction tender forms as required.
Subsequently, the Treasury, the SEC, and the Federal
Reserve jointly reviewed the government securities market
and issued a report describing a number of policy and
regulatory changes aimed at improving the functioning of
the market and avoiding such violations in the future.1
Some of the reforms were implemented immediately, and
others were recommended for legislative approval.
Many of the reforms were intended to make Treasury
auctions accessible to more participants. The set of ﬁrms
allowed to submit bids for customers was broadened to
include all government securities brokers and dealers,
not just primary dealers and depository institutions. The
requirements for becoming a primary dealer were loosened
by eliminating the rule that to qualify the dealer must
account for at least 1 percent of the dollar volume of all
customer trades in the secondary market. In addition, the
maximum for noncompetitive tender awards for notes and
bonds was raised from $1 million to $5 million; however, to
ensure that noncompetitive awards were reserved for the
smaller bidders for whom they were intended, noncompeti-
tive bids were restricted to bidders having no positions in
the when-issued, futures, or forward markets at the time of
the auction and not submitting competitive bids.
1. Joint Report on the Government Securities Market (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Ofﬁce, January 1992).
Other changes were aimed more directly at the enforce-
ment of auction rules. Customer bids are now spot-checked
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to ensure their
authenticity, and all large auction awards are now conﬁrmed
directly with the customer. The report also emphasized the
need to automate the auction procedure, which has since
taken place.
The report also considered the beneﬁts of replacing the
then-current multiple-price auction system for notes and
bonds with a uniform-price system, under which all success-
ful bidders would be awarded securities at the lowest price.
The report suggested that such a change might alleviate
some concern among auction participants about bidding
above the market consensus. Consequently, more investors
might bid on their own rather than through primary dealers,
reducing the primary dealers’ advantage at the auctions that
arises from knowing the bidding intentions of their custom-
ers. The Treasury subsequently began an experiment with
this auction method for two- and ﬁve-year notes. By
November 1998, all Treasury securities were being auc-
tioned on a uniform-price basis.
In addition, some changes were implemented to detect
and respond to short squeezes in the secondary market. A
group made up of representatives of the SEC, the Treasury,
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System was established
to improve surveillance efforts. The Treasury stated its
intention to reopen any security that was experiencing an
‘‘acute, protracted’’ shortage in order to increase the supply
of the security. The reopening could be implemented in
several different ways, one of which is to immediately
auction an amount sufﬁciently large to eliminate the possi-
bility that the squeeze would persist.
Finally, the Congress enacted the Government Securities
Act Amendments of 1993. Among other provisions, the
amendments give the Treasury the authority to require
holders of large positions in a particular security to report
on their positions if a shortage emerges. The Treasury has
conducted two tests of the reporting system, one in June
1998 and the other in July 1999. In both cases, the Treasury
required investors with reportable positions in excess of
$21⁄2 billion in the speciﬁed security to ﬁle large-position
reports.
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price). For options on long-bond futures, open inter-
est totaled about 950,000 contracts and daily trading
volume averaged about 130,000 contracts. Because
of the liquidity of this market, combined with the
ease with which investors can establish ‘‘short’’ posi-
tions by selling futures contracts, these instruments
are also commonly used for hedging purposes.
The seller of a CBOT Treasury futures contract
agrees to deliver a Treasury security to the purchaser
of the contract at a speciﬁed price at a future date.
Most positions in these futures contracts are closed
out prior to delivery by entering into offsetting trades,
and delivery does not take place. However, the possi-
bility of delivery links the price of the contract to
the deliverable Treasury securities. Typically, several
securities are eligible for delivery into the contract.31
The long-bond futures contract, for example, allows
any Treasury bond with more than ﬁfteen years
remaining to maturity at the expiration of the contract
to be delivered (for the March 2000 contract, thirty-
ﬁve such securities are eligible).
One of the securities eligible for delivery is the
‘‘cheapest to deliver.’’ That is, the cost to the seller of
the futures contract of purchasing the security to
make delivery will be lower than the cost of deliv-
ering any other eligible security. The price of the
contract is inﬂuenced primarily by the value of the
cheapest-to-deliver security. Moreover, the cheapest-
to-deliver status has at times signiﬁcantly affected the
yield of that Treasury security. In particular, the
cheapest-to-deliver security is often traded more
actively as market participants hedge their futures
position, which enhances the security’s liquidity.
Because of this enhanced liquidity and because some
investors may need to purchase the security to make
delivery into the futures contract, the cheapest-to-
deliver security may trade at a premium to Treasury
securities having similar maturities.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
AFFECTING THE MARKET
The structure and behavior of the Treasury market is
continually changing. Some of the developments and
emergent trends that have recently inﬂuenced the
market are discussed in this section.
Availability of a New Instrument:
Inﬂation-Indexed Securities
A signiﬁcant innovation in the Treasury market in
the past several years has been the introduction of a
new type of debt instrument: Treasury inﬂation-
indexed securities, or TIIS.32 Since the program’s
inception in January 1997, about $92 billion of TIIS
have been issued.33 Unlike previously issued Trea-
sury securities, the coupon and principal payments
on TIIS increase with a measure of the general price
level—the consumer price index (CPI). Indexation
provides protection against the possibility that inﬂa-
tion will erode the amount of goods and services that
could be purchased with the interest or principal
payments.
The Mechanics of TIIS
Whereas the principal amount of a nominal Treasury
security remains ﬁxed in nominal terms, the principal
amount on a TIIS adjusts over time by the rate of
inﬂation. The value of the principal on a given day
is calculated by multiplying the principal amount
at issuance by a daily index ratio determined by a
reference CPI for that day divided by the reference
CPI on the day of issue. The reference CPI is based
on the non–seasonally adjusted CPI lagged about two
and one-half months, as published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS).34
If the average rate of inﬂation is positive, the
principal amount of the TIIS generally rises over the
life of the security.35 Coupon payments will also
increase in line with the rate of inﬂation, as coupon
31. Eligible securities trade at a premium or a discount to face
value simply because of differences in their coupon rates. To adjust
for this effect, the CBOT contract scales the invoice amount—the
amount that the investor who is long the futures contract must pay
upon receiving an eligible security—by a ‘‘conversion factor’’ for that
security.
32. Several government-sponsored enterprises, corporations, and
local governments followed the Treasury’s lead by issuing indexed
debt in early 1997. In addition, the Treasury began selling inﬂation-
indexed savings bonds, called I-bonds, in September 1998.
33. When adjusted for the accrual of inﬂation compensation, the
total amount of TIIS outstanding is higher than this amount.
34. Speciﬁcally, the CPI refers to the non–seasonally adjusted U.S.
City Average All Items Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consum-
ers. The reference CPI for the ﬁrst day of a given month is the CPI
reported for the third preceding calendar month, and the reference CPI
for days over the rest of the month is a weighted average of the
reference CPI ﬁgures on the ﬁrst days of the current month and the
following month. The lag involved in calculating the index ratio is
unavoidable because the monthly CPI is released with a lag and the
reference CPI for the beginning of the following month must be
known.
35. A period of deﬂation could decrease the principal amount of
the TIIS. However, the TIIS program provides that the cumulative
adjustment to the principal amount at the maturity of the security may
not be negative.
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coupon rate multiplied by the principal amount. The
quoted prices of TIIS do not reﬂect the accumulated
amount of inﬂation compensation; the value of the
security exchanged when a TIIS is traded is the
quoted price multiplied by the current index ratio
plus the amount of accrued interest.
TIIS do not offer perfect protection against inﬂa-
tion risk, for several reasons. First, TIIS holders face
some inﬂation risk because of the lag involved in
calculating the reference index. Second, holders pay
taxes on inﬂation compensation, so the degree of
inﬂation protection is reduced by an investor’s tax
rate.36 In addition, TIIS holders face some risk that
the method used to calculate the CPI will change.37
The BLS has implemented several methodological
changes in recent years, partly in response to recom-
mendations by the Boskin Commission, an advisory
group appointed to study the CPI. Some market par-
ticipants estimate that these changes have shaved
about 0.7 percentage point from the index’s annual
rate of growth. Such a reduction directly affects the
rate at which payments on TIIS increase, and hence
the value of TIIS. The risk of additional changes in
the method of calculating the CPI may result in a risk
premium in TIIS yields; however, many market par-
ticipants believe that most of the likely changes have
already been implemented.
The Potential Appeal of TIIS
The protection against inﬂation provided by TIIS,
previously unavailable in the Treasury market, may
be valued by investors, who tend to be concerned
about real rates of return (that is, about the amount of
goods and services they will be able to purchase with
the payments from a security). Because the payments
automatically adjust to compensate for inﬂation, the
yield on an inﬂation-indexed security reﬂects the real
rate of return that would be realized over the maturity
of the security. The yield on a nominal security, in
contrast, includes not only the anticipated real return
on the security, but also compensation for inﬂation.
This inﬂation compensation includes the expected
level of inﬂation as well as an inﬂation risk premium,
as described below.
By holding an inﬂation-indexed security to matu-
rity, an investor can lock in a long-term real rate of
return, a strategy that may be appealing to investors
with long investment horizons. Investors with shorter
horizons also can protect themselves against inﬂation
by holding TIIS, although they are subject to real
interest rate risk; that is, changes in TIIS yields will
generate capital gains or losses that depend on the
duration of the security.
However, the risks from holding TIIS are likely to
be smaller than those from holding nominal Treasury
securities. In addition to real interest rate risk, returns
on nominal securities are subject to the risks pre-
sented by unpredictable changes in inﬂation. An
increase in expected inﬂation, for example, typically
causes yields on nominal Treasury securities to rise
(assuming that investors demand the same real return
going forward), generating capital losses for current
investors. In contrast, TIIS would maintain the same
real return without a change in yields, and thus hold-
ers of TIIS would not suffer any capital losses.38 By
eliminating this ‘‘inﬂation risk,’’ TIIS may offer more
stable real returns than nominal Treasury securities.
Thus, investors may demand a higher expected real
return on nominal Treasury securities than on TIIS to
compensate them for the additional risks of holding
those securities.39 By issuing indexed debt, the gov-
ernment, rather than the investor, assumes the risks
associated with unpredicted changes in inﬂation and
therefore does not have to pay this ‘‘inﬂation risk
premium’’ to the investor, which may lower the gov-
ernment’s cost of borrowing.
An additional beneﬁt of issuing TIIS, it has been
argued, is that yields on indexed debt might provide
policymakers with a timely and informative measure
of market expectations about real interest rates. In
that case, the difference between yields on TIIS and
yields on nominal Treasury securities—the measure
of inﬂation compensation on nominal securities—
may contain valuable information about investors’
outlook for inﬂation. This measure of inﬂation com-
pensation reﬂects primarily the expected level of
inﬂation over the maturity of the instruments plus the
36. This effect is inconsequential if TIIS are held in nontaxable
accounts. The taxation of the inﬂation compensation on TIIS is
comparable to that for nominal Treasury securities, on which the
inﬂation compensation (embedded in the coupon rate) is also taxed.
37. If the CPI is discontinued or substantially altered in a manner
that is deemed ‘‘materially adverse to the interests of an investor,’’ the
Treasury, in consultation with the BLS, will substitute an appropriate
alternative index. However, incremental improvements in the CPI do
not receive special treatment.
38. In addition, TIIS protect investors from unexpected changes in
inﬂation that are not reﬂected in nominal yields. Such changes would
not generate capital losses on nominal Treasury securities but would
still erode the real returns on those securities.
39. The measure of risk considered here is the variation in real
returns. Investors may instead be concerned about the covariance
of returns with the returns on other assets or with changes in
consumption.
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by differences in the liquidity of the securities.40
The possibility that interest costs may be lower,
along with potential attendant beneﬁts, may explain
why a growing number of countries are issuing
indexed debt. Canada and France have launched new
programs over the past decade, and a number of other
countries, some with high and variable levels of inﬂa-
tion, had established indexed debt programs much
earlier. The United Kingdom implemented its pro-
gram in 1981, and as of September 1999 indexed
gilts represented about 22 percent of all outstanding
U.K. government debt.41 By comparison, TIIS repre-
sented about 3 percent of all marketable U.S. govern-
ment debt at that time. However, because of the size
of the U.S. Treasury market, the dollar amount of
TIIS outstanding is approaching the dollar-equivalent
amount of outstanding indexed gilts.
Market Activity in TIIS
To date, the Treasury has issued six inﬂation-indexed
securities—one ﬁve-year note, three ten-year notes,
and two thirty-year bonds. Each issue has been
reopened once, leaving its total size roughly between
$14 billion and $16 billion. Currently, the Treasury
issues only ten- and thirty-year TIIS, alternating
between the two maturities at auctions in the ﬁrst
month of every quarter.
Activity in the secondary market for TIIS has
remained moderate relative to comparable nominal
issues. According to data for primary dealers col-
lected by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
daily trading volume in TIIS over the second quarter
of 1999 averaged about 1.7 percent of TIIS outstand-
ing, compared with about 5.0 percent for nominal
Treasury notes and bonds. The more limited activity
in TIIS may reﬂect the nature of these securities:
They provide safe, stable long-run returns and may
therefore appeal to investors who are less inclined to
trade their holdings actively.
Other measures suggest that TIIS are somewhat
less liquid than off-the-run nominal Treasury securi-
ties.42 Discussions with some primary dealers indi-
cate that bid–offer spreads on TIIS, in terms of prices,
are typically about 1.6¢ to 6.3¢ per $100 face value.
This spread is somewhat wider than bid–offer spreads
for nominal Treasury securities, which are reportedly
1.6¢ or less, but it is much narrower than bid–offer
spreads for corporate bonds.
According to market participants, liquidity in the
TIIS market is gradually improving. Aside from the
pickup in volume during the market turmoil in the
third quarter of 1998, the volume of TIIS transactions
among primary dealers reported to the New York
Reserve Bank has been about 26 percent higher in
1999 than in 1998, whereas the volume in nominal
Treasury coupon securities has declined 12 percent.
TIIS volume is concentrated around the auction
cycle: Over the past four auctions, average daily
volume during the four weeks after the announce-
ment of an auction has been 92 percent higher than
that during other weeks. Although the Chicago Board
of Trade offers options and futures contracts on TIIS
similar to those on other Treasury securities, market
activity has been negligible.
Yields on TIIS
The ﬁrst TIIS issued, a ten-year note, was auctioned
on January 29, 1997, at a yield of 3.45 percent. Since
then, the yield on the ten-year TIIS has generally
risen to the current level above 4 percent (chart 9).
Over that period, the yield on TIIS has been less
volatile than that on the nominal ten-year security.
On an average day, the ten-year TIIS yield changed
less than 11⁄2 basis points, compared with more than
4 basis points for the nominal security. In addition,
the yield on the nominal security has moved in a
much wider range of about 21⁄2 percentage points,
compared with about 3⁄4 percentage point for the TIIS
yield.
The spread between these yields—the inﬂation
compensation on the ten-year nominal Treasury
note—fell over 1997 and the ﬁrst half of 1998, along
with the actual rate of CPI inﬂation and a survey
measure of long-run inﬂation expectations among
professional forecasters. However, the decline in
inﬂation compensation was more dramatic than that
of the survey measure, suggesting that some of the
narrowing of the yield spread may have been driven
by a decline in the inﬂation risk premium.
Relative changes in yields may also be explained
in part by differences in the liquidity of nominal
securities and TIIS. In the fall of 1998, yields on
nominal Treasury securities dropped sharply, pushing
ten-year inﬂation compensation as low as 69 basis
points. This dramatic narrowing of the yield spread,
though it may have partially reﬂected a change in the
40. Differences in duration and convexity between TIIS and nomi-
nal securities may also affect the yield spread.
41. Quarterly Gilts Review: 3rd Quarter 1999, United Kingdom
Debt Management Ofﬁce (October 1999).
42. No distinction is made between on-the-run and off-the-run TIIS
because there are no large differences in liquidity between those
securities, as is the case with nominal Treasury securities.
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shift in investors’ preferences toward more-liquid
assets, particularly on-the-run nominal Treasury secu-
rities. Inﬂation compensation returned to higher lev-
els in 1999 as the demand for liquidity lessened and
inﬂation expectations rose.
TIIS yields also appear to be signiﬁcantly inﬂu-
enced by supply. In particular, seven of the fourteen
largest daily changes in the ten-year TIIS yield over
the period shown in chart 9 took place immediately
before or after TIIS auctions. The largest movements
in the ten-year nominal yields, by contrast, were all in
response to either macroeconomic news or the reallo-
cation into safe and liquid assets during the fall of
1998.
Reduction in the Supply
of Nominal Treasury Debt
In response to the budget surpluses of the past two
years, the Treasury has decreased its securities issu-
ance enough to shrink the amount of marketable debt
outstanding. This development has several implica-
tions for the Treasury securities market.
Developments in the Treasury Bill Market
After decades of increases, marketable Treasury debt
outstanding has decreased over the past two years.43
Because the issuance of Treasury bills has been cut
more sharply than that of Treasury coupon securities,
the decline has not been evenly spread across the
maturity spectrum (table 4). From December 1996 to
September 1999, total coupon securities outstanding
declined about 7 percent whereas total bills outstand-
ing decreased about 16 percent. In association with
the downtrend in supply, the average daily trading
volume in bills reported by primary dealers declined
about 44 percent over the period (chart 10). In con-
trast, the average daily trading volume in nominal
coupon securities reported by primary dealers in Sep-
tember 1999, though off its peak of fall 1998, was
only about 2 percent below its level in December
1996.
The decline in the amount of bills outstanding may
have weakened the connection between yields on
bills and those on longer-term Treasury securities.44
The spread between the six-month yield implied by a
smoothed yield curve based on coupon securities and
the yield on the six-month bill has increased over the
past four years (chart 10). Although bills have typi-
cally commanded higher prices (lower yields) than
coupon securities of similar maturities because of
their greater liquidity, the recent increase in the
spread is correlated with the decrease in the supply of
bills and could suggest a scarcity premium on bills.45
Two conﬂicting effects may have been at play in the
bill market: The reduction in issuance may have
made bills less liquid, reducing their attractiveness
relative to coupon securities; at the same time, the
reduction in supply in the face of continuing strong
43. However, total Treasury debt, which includes securities held in
government accounts, has increased over the period.
44. Similar effects have been documented by Gregory R. Duffee,
‘‘Idiosyncratic Variation of Treasury Bill Yields,’’ Journal of Finance,
vol. 51 (June 1996), pp. 527–51.
45. For insights into the relation between the liquidity of bills
and coupon securities and their yields, see Yakov Amihud and
Haim Mendelson, ‘‘Liquidity, Maturity, and the Yields on U.S. Trea-
sury Securities,’’ Journal of Finance, vol. 46 (September 1991),
pp. 1411–25.
9. Yields on nominal and indexed Treasury securities

















Note. Yield data are based on most recently issued securities and extend
through October 1999; yield spread is yield on ten-year nominal securities less
yield on ten-year TIIS. Expectations data and CPI data extend into the third
quarter.
1. Median expectation of CPI inﬂation over the next ten years among pro-
fessional forecasters surveyed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Source. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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attractiveness, pushing their prices up and their yields
down.
Treasury Debt Buybacks
Faced with the prospect of continuing declines in the
volume of debt outstanding, the Treasury has pro-
posed a new tool for debt management. In August
1999, it published for comment a proposed rule under
which it could repurchase its own securities in the
market. The Treasury expects to be able by early
2000 to conduct buybacks should it decide to do so.
The Treasury believes that the program would have
three beneﬁts. First, buybacks would allow it to main-
tain the large size of new issues, a feature thought to
promote greater liquidity. (As noted earlier, the Trea-
sury has also concentrated issuance in fewer maturi-
ties in order to preserve their size.) Second, it could
use buybacks as a cash management tool, absorbing
excess cash when tax revenues exceed immediate
spending needs. And third, by concentrating the buy-
backs on longer-term securities, it would be able to
halt the recent upcreep in the average maturity of the
debt.
Under the current proposal, the buybacks would
be implemented through ‘‘reverse auctions’’ in which
the Treasury would announce the approximate total
amount of the securities it wished to redeem and
the particular securities that would be eligible. Bids
would have to be submitted by or through primary
dealers so that the Treasury could make use of the
open market facility of the New York Reserve Bank.
The total amount of bids accepted would not exceed,
and could be less than, the announced amount of
redemptions.
Some market observers believe that buybacks
could initially reduce yields on the targeted securities
relative to those on more liquid issues. They argue
that investors, knowing that they will periodically
have an opportunity to sell them back to the Treasury,





Notes and bonds (remaining maturity)
Less than 5 years 5–10 years 10 years or more
1994 .................................... 3,111 734 1,606 320 451
1995 .................................... 3,292 761 1,749 325 457
1996 .................................... 3,445 777 1,842 338 488
1997 .................................... 3,409 715 1,823 356 515
1998 .................................... 3,271 691 1,691 349 540
1999 .................................... 3,125 653 1,567 346 559
Note. Data are for end of period; for 1999, data end on September 30.
Excludes Treasury inﬂation-indexed securities (TIIS) and Federal Financing
Bank series.
Source. Monthly Statement of the Public Debt of the United States, table III.
10. Effect of the reduction in supply on the Treasury
bill market, July 1994–September 1999




















Average daily transactions in bills
Outstanding amount
of bills
Spread between six-month yield
on coupon securities and yield
on the six-month bill
Note. The data are monthly. The six-month yield on coupon securities is the
yield implied by a smoothed yield curve based on Treasury coupon securities
with remaining maturities ranging from a few months to several years.
Source. Transactions, amounts reported by primary dealers to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York; outstanding amounts, Monthly Statement of the
Public Debt of the United States; yield spread, authors’ calculations.
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the targeted securities. However, some market partici-
pants, in their comments about the proposed rule,
have expressed concern that removing a considerable
portion of an individual Treasury issue through a
buyback could decrease the liquidity of the securities
from that issue that remain in the market.
Under current accounting rules for the federal bud-
get, the buyback program could increase the reported
level of federal spending in the short term. If the
price at which a security is repurchased is above par,
the premium would be counted as an interest expense
in the year of the repurchase, although reported inter-
est expenses in the future would decline.
Debt Issuance
by Government-Sponsored Enterprises
To ﬁll the gap left by a dwindling supply of Treasury
securities, two government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in 1998 intro-
duced new series of debt securities that in some ways
mimic Treasury securities: Fannie Mae ‘‘benchmark’’
and Freddie Mac ‘‘reference’’ notes and bonds. GSEs
are federally chartered, private institutions; their debt
securities are not backed by the full faith and credit
of the United States. However, debt securities issued
by GSEs are perceived as being quite safe and typi-
cally trade at yields only slightly above those on
Treasury securities.46
By issuing securities regularly and in large vol-
umes, these two GSEs appear to be structuring their
issues so as to achieve the greater liquidity and
benchmark status of Treasury securities, presumably
to lower their ﬁnancing costs. The two GSEs have
also increased the predictability of the offerings by
announcing issuance calendars in advance. More-
over, the new securities are designed to appeal to
international investors, as they can be electronically
transferred through international clearing organiza-
tions such as Euroclear and Cedel as well as through
the NBES system.
As of early November 1999, outstanding amounts
of benchmark and reference securities totaled more
than $150 billion, with maturities ranging from two
to thirty years.47 That month, the two GSEs intro-
duced benchmark and reference bills programs
arranging for regular auctions of securities with matu-
rities of less than one year.
Market participants characterize the liquidity of
the most recently issued benchmark and reference
notes as comparable to that of off-the-run Treasury
securities. Indicative of their increased liquidity,
benchmark and reference notes are actively used as
collateral in the overnight repo market, although,
reportedly, they are rarely used in term repo transac-
tions. Benchmark and reference notes reportedly have
begun to be used as substitutes for Treasury securities
as instruments for hedging. Their yields have tracked
yields on corporate debt and mortgage-backed securi-
ties more closely than have yields on Treasury securi-
ties, a characteristic traders have cited as an advan-
tage for hedging purposes. The trading volume in
GSE debt by primary dealers, however, amounts to
only a fraction of their trading in Treasury securities.
Trends in Market Structure
The structure supporting the trading of Treasury secu-
rities has changed in several ways in recent years.
Market participants have relied more heavily on pri-
vate clearing arrangements since the Federal Reserve
began assessing a fee on intraday credit. More
recently, market participants have also increased their
use of electronic trading systems.
Use of Alternative Clearing Arrangements
In April 1994, the Federal Reserve began to charge a
fee on daylight overdrafts, initially at an annual rate
of 24 basis points and raised to 36 basis points in
1995. Within six months after the fee was imposed,
average daylight overdrafts fell 40 percent, from
about $70 billion to about $43 billion. The decline
was due partly to government securities dealers’ deci-
sion to arrange repo transactions earlier in the day
and to deliver securities used as collateral more
quickly to cover overdrafts generated by the repay-
ment of maturing repos. As a consequence, trading
activity in the repo market became more concentrated
early in the morning, spurring the trading desk at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York to enter the
market earlier to conduct open market operations.
The desk moved its intervention time from about
11:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. in January 1997 and to
9:30 a.m in April 1999. Another change in market
practice has been the growing use of tri-party repos,
in which both parties to the transaction use the same
custodian bank, so that the securities used as collat-
46. Debt securities issued by GSEs are considered government
securities for purposes of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
For details on legal provisions particular to GSE securities, see
‘‘Assessing the Public Costs and Beneﬁts of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac,’’ Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (May 1996), p. 10.
47. Excludes callable benchmark and reference notes.
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leaving the custodian bank, thereby reducing day-
light overdrafts at the Federal Reserve. Tri-party re-
pos also facilitate the back-ofﬁce handling of the
transactions.
Market participants have also increased their use
of netting arrangements, such as those offered by
the Government Securities Clearing Corporation
(GSCC). This industry service organization, estab-
lished in 1986 and owned by market participants,
provides centralized clearing and settlement services
for outright and repo transactions in Treasury securi-
ties and some GSE-issued securities. GSCC estab-
lishes a single net position for each participant’s daily
trading activity in a given security by netting all cash
and repo transactions and Treasury auction purchases.
Netting may reduce the costs associated with securi-
ties transfers by reducing the number of transactions
and lowering daylight overdraft charges.48
GSCC guarantees the settlement of all trades
entered in its system by interposing itself between the
original trading parties and becoming the legal coun-
terparty for settlement purposes. Were a ﬁrm to
become insolvent, GSCC would use the participant’s
clearing fund and margin deposits to liquidate the
member’s positions. If those deposits were insufﬁ-
cient to cover the liquidation of all positions, the
remaining liabilities would be prorated among the
participants who traded most recently with the failed
ﬁrm. GSCC is used by primary dealers and other
active market participants, who may value the
conﬁdentiality of brokered trades offered by the
organization.
Growth of Electronic Trading
Participants in the Treasury market have typically
arranged transactions by telephone. In recent years,
however, advances in technology have enabled them
to transact through electronic communication net-
works. Electronic trading represents a small, though
rapidly increasing, share of the aggregate trading
volume of Treasury securities. Analysts estimate that
the share of electronic trading in total trading activity
in the Treasury market had risen from about half a
percent on average in 1998 to about 2 percent to
4 percent by fall 1999, still well below the share of
equity trading done on line (reported to be about
14 percent).
In November 1999, the Bond Market Association
identiﬁed thirty-nine systems offering electronic
transaction services in the U.S. market for govern-
ment and private debt securities, up from twenty-six
in 1998 and eleven in 1997.49 In addition, some
interdealer brokers have introduced or plan to intro-
duce electronic systems (primarily) for the Treasury
market. These systems offer the same anonymity of
the current interdealer broker system but could drive
down interdealer broker fees, quicken execution,
and streamline the relation between the ‘‘front ofﬁce’’
and the ‘‘back ofﬁce.’’ The development of electronic
interdealer brokerage is poised to boost the market
share of electronic trading of Treasury securities.
SUMMARY
The market for Treasury securities is vast and serves
important functions for numerous investors. The
characteristics and behavior of the market are not
static but instead evolve with the changing objectives
and needs of both the Treasury and investors. This
article has identiﬁed several important changes in
recent years, including the introduction of indexed
debt securities, a decline in budgetary needs, and
changes in the way Treasury securities are traded.
Although these and additional, unforeseen changes
will continue to shape the Treasury market, the cru-
cial role of Treasury securities in world ﬁnancial
markets is likely to remain unchanged.
48. Heidi Willman Richards, ‘‘Daylight Overdraft Fees and the
Federal Reserve’s Payment System Risk Policy,’’ Federal Reserve
Bulletin, vol. 81 (December 1995), pp. 1065–77.
49. eCommerce in the U.S. Fixed Income Markets: The 1999
Review of Electronic Transaction Systems, Bond Market Association
(November 1999).
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